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Abstract Several recent cases judged by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (the Court) have raised interesting issues related to the possibility for operators 
of food chains to use national quality signs to indicate territory of origin, which are different 
from the regulatory European ‘Protected Geographical Indications’. The various attempts by 
France (a list of quality signs), Germany (‘Markenqualität aus deutschen Landen’ sign) and 
Belgium (‘Walloon’ sign) have all been condemned as protectionist policies contradicting the 
free movement of goods in the European Market. These national quality signs can be seen as 
attempt to defend the viability of specific kinds of activities (involving small enterprises) in 
specific places (rural areas). These cases are a good illustration of the difficulties that a 
Member State of the European Communities (Member State) faces in trying to protect its 
traditional activities and/or rural areas in a way that is compatible with free markets. The 
paper analyses the recent court decisions underlining economic aspects such as information 
delivery and the cost of alternative protection mechanisms for these activities. We highlight in 
particular the collective trademarks and the kind of intellectual property right they form by the 
economic theory of clubs, and make some comparisons with protected geographical 
indications. 
Keywords Geographical Indications . Intellectual property rights . Free movement of 
goods . European regulation 
 
JEL Classifications K11 . K19 
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1 Introduction 
 
Several recent cases judged by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Court) 
have raised interesting issues related to the possibility for Member States of the European 
Communities (Member States) to protect their various agricultural activities with the help of 
national quality signs to indicate territory of origin, as an alternative to the European labelling 
regulation . The European labels are known as Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs) and 
are a form of intellectual property (IP) rights protected by European Regulation 510/2006 (the 
European Regulation).1 The various attempts made by France2 (a list of broad quality signs 
such as ‘Salaison d’Auvergne’, ‘Franche Comté’, ‘Savoie’ etc.), Germany3 (‘Markenqualität 
aus deutschen Landen’ sign) and Belgium4 (‘Walloon’ sign), which relate to a class of 
products rather than one specific product, gave rise to the cases examined in this study. They 
were all condemned by the Court as protectionist policies contradicting the free movement of 
goods in the European Market. 
 
These proposed national policies are aimed at providing information to consumers 
about product quality as well as defending the viability of specific kinds of activities (of small 
enterprises) in specific places (rural areas). Given the generality of the current proposed 
geographic labelling, it is fairly clear that protection of these activities was the motivation. 
Thus, these cases are a good illustration of the difficulties faced by governments trying to 
make the protection of certain traditional activities compatible with free markets. 
                                                 
1 For a study on the expansion of PGIs see Barjolle and Sylvander (2002). 
2 C-6/02. Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. [2007] ECR I-164. 
3 ECJ Case C-325/00 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany. [2002] ECR I-
9977. 
4. ECJ C-255/03 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [2007] ECR I-5567. 
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Interestingly, supporting development of the rural economy is a declared aim of the European 
Regulation: along with providing consumers with information on quality, in the preamble to 
the European Regulation mention is made of rural economies with particular attention to less-
favoured areas - “the promotion of products having certain characteristics can be of 
considerable benefit to the rural economy, particularly in less-favoured or remote areas, by 
improving the incomes of farmers and by retaining the rural population in these areas.”5 This 
position is in line with the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy which, as pointed 
out by Becker (2009), promotes rural development through improvement to food quality. The 
Court ruling condemning protective national policies, which clearly have the same aims, is 
therefore somewhat surprising and requires some explanation. At the same time, amassing 
various regulations, at different institutional levels, with identical objectives is questionable.  
 
The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of these cases focusing on their legal 
and economic characteristics. Section II presents the cases and explores their legal aspects. 
The fact that the geographical names which would be protected under the proposed national 
policies cannot be considered as IP (contrary to PGIs) is underlined as a cornerstone of the 
Court’s decisions. Economic analysis of the cases considers the two aims of the policies being 
considered: delivery of information to consumers on the one hand, and protection of a certain 
kind of agricultural activity on the other hand. The information that geographical names 
would provide to consumers, especially in the case of PGIs, has been thoroughly analysed in 
the economics literature (Auriol and Schilizzi (2003) and Marette and Crespi (2003)). But the 
idea of protection per se through the use of geographical labelling has not really been 
                                                 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and 
designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union, L 93/12, 
31.3.2006. Point (2) of the preamble. 
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investigated although the fact that PGIs create non-tariff trade barriers (Charlier and Ngo 
2007 and Josling 2006) generating benefit as well as costs for a country has been pushed 
forward (Anders and Caswell 2009, Evans and Blakeney 2006). The economic analysis of the 
cases developed in this article focuses on this protection per se aspect, interpreting the Court’s 
decisions as a ‘social choice’ about admissible ways to protect activities (Section III). If PGIs 
are excluded for most of the products related to the cases analysed, and if the only protection 
of IP is acceptable, then other forms of IP will need to be found for these activities.6 On this 
basis, Section III of the paper focuses on collective trademarks mentioning geographical 
indications. This form of IP is compared with that provided by PGIs and the results are used 
in Section IV to outline some of the implications for society of shifting protective labelling 
from a system of national policies to a collective trademark regime. The relation established 
in this paper between the IP rights of PGIs and public goods on the one hand, and between the 
IP rights of collective trademarks and club goods on the other hand, highlights a different 
aspect to the Court’s decision than only the interest in maintaining the free movement of 
goods. 
 
 
 
2 Presentation of the cases 
 
The cases in this study have some common characteristics. First the parties are the same, in 
that the applicant is the Commission of the EC and the defendant is an EC Member State 
(France, Germany or Belgium). Second, the issue being judged is the same: national legal 
protection afforded by names or regional labels that explicitly (Salaisons d’Auvergne, Savoie, 
                                                 
6 This can be seen as a branding strategy choice. See Argawal and Barone (2005). 
 5
Franche Comté, Walloon label of quality…) include a geographical indication. Third, the 
judgement is the same. In every case, the national legal protection being applied for was 
found to violate the provisions of Article 28 EC stipulating that “Quantitative restrictions on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member 
States”. Finally, the Court, in every case, refused to consider that the different national legal 
protections might come under Article 30 EC,7 which lists possible exceptions to Article 28 
EC including “the protection of industrial and commercial property”. This is the crux of the 
matter. 
 
PGIs are recognized as IP rights by the World Trade Organization (WTO) TRIPS – 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - agreement. The Court, however, did 
not acknowledge the status of industrial and commercial property in relation to the names and 
regional labels being proposed, since they were not registered as PGIs under European 
Regulation 2081/928 on the protection of geographical indications (GIs). Furthermore, 
because these names and regional labels refer to classes of products rather than to single 
products, the Court deemed that they could not, in any case, be considered PGIs within the 
European framework. 
 
                                                 
7 Article 30 states that “The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States”. 
8 Now European Regulation 510/2006. 
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What lesson can we draw from these cases? In the cases we analyse no harm in the 
form of economic or financial loss was directly at stake. The national legal protections being 
requested were attacked by the European Commission as such, because of their potential to 
discriminate on the grounds of nationality. The same reasoning and judgement was applied by 
the Court, which used the arguments of the European legal standard of free movement of 
goods between Member States, and only registered GIs could be considered as exceptions. 
Outside the European regulatory framework on GIs, any national legal protection that 
mentions the geographic origin of a product or of a class of products will always be 
considered as interfering with the free movement of goods between Member States. In order 
to be considered an exception to the free movement of goods, a national legal protection in 
the form of a quality sign mentioning a geographic origin has to be in keeping with the 
European regulatory framework of regulation 2081/92, that is, it has to protect IP represented 
by a registered PGI. This position may seem odd. It can be seen as being in contradiction with 
the attempt of the European Union (EU) to promote the protection of GIs at the international 
level. In this context, the EU is generally considered a strong supporter of PGIs.9 However, 
national legal protection for geographical origin labelling outside the European legal 
framework is a prime example of a threat of discrimination in favour of a country’s own 
products.10 The argument that it provides information for consumers (see section IV) is of 
secondary importance. In requiring that national protection afforded by geographic origin 
labelling complies with the European regulation on GI protection the Court is arguing from 
                                                 
9 See Charlier and Ngo(2007), Evans and Blakeney (2006) and Josling (2006). 
10 At the international level the European Commission strongly supports its model of protection of geographical 
indications. Charlier and Ngo (2007) showed how the European wish of unilateral harmonization of the 
international systems of protection of geographical indications on the European model contradicts National 
Treatment and has produced the international dispute over GIs arbitrated by the WTO. 
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the point of view that it is IP rights, rather than quality per se, that is the subject of legal 
protection.  
 
In order to comment on the substantive aspects of the Court’s decisions, this reference 
to registered PGIs needs to be explored further. A PGI in European Regulation is the 
inclusion of the name of a region in the labelling of an agricultural product or a foodstuff that 
meets all of three requirements (Article 2.1 of the European Regulation): (i) the product 
originates from that region; (ii) the product possesses “a specific quality, reputation or other 
characteristics attributable to that geographical origin”; (iii) the “production and/or processing 
and/or preparation” of the product take place in that region. To be eligible for a PGI, an 
agricultural product or foodstuff must comply with a product specification form (Article 4 of 
the European Regulation). This document has also to identify the authorities or bodies that 
should verify compliance with the product specification. In addition to its definition there are 
two other features that are important and highlight the ‘nature’ of the IP right of a PGI. First, 
only groups (any association of producers or processors working with the same agricultural 
product or foodstuff, irrespective of its legal form or composition) are entitled to apply for 
registration (Article 5.1 of the European Regulation). Second, a name registered under the 
European Regulation may be used by any operator marketing an agricultural product or food 
stuff conforming to the corresponding specification (Article 8.1 of the European Regulation). 
 
These two characteristics allow us to draw a parallel between the definition of the 
nature of the IP right of a PGI implicitly used by the European regulator, and public goods 
theory. The first characteristic shows that the IP of a PGI is ‘non rivalrous’. If the agricultural 
good corresponding to a PGI is individually exploited, the IP of a PGI concerns a group of 
producers. The second characteristic shows that the IP of a PGI is ‘non excludable’. As soon 
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as an operator conforms to the product specification of a PGI, he can use this PGI without 
being able to prevent another operator whose products conform to the product specification 
from also using it. As a consequence, in a given area the number of operators marketing an 
agricultural product or foodstuff corresponding to a PGI cannot be limited. This clearly shows 
that the property rights represented by a PGI cannot be appropriated by an operator even if he 
is the only one marketing the corresponding product. These two properties (non-rivalry and 
non-excludability) of the IP of a PGI attributable to Articles 5.1 and 8.1 of the European 
Regulation show that in the spirit of the European regulator the IP right of a PGI is a public 
good.11 This interpretation, furthermore, is perfectly in line with the idea expressed in the 
European Regulation (in its Article 2) according to which the quality of the agricultural 
product or foodstuff is essentially (or exclusively) due to its geographical origin, that is, to 
human and natural factors historically constructed by a society, inherited and therefore 
escaping the strict operator ability condition. An operator marketing a PGI benefits from the 
pre-existing reputation of the PGI, and cannot be considered its creator. The difference with a 
privately owned trademark (i.e. with a privately owned IP right) is here very clear. The 
reputation of a trademark is constructed and maintained by its owner. In line with this, a 
trademark owner can lose his property right if he ceases to exploit his trademark or if he 
ceases to defend it. A PGI, however, ‘never dies’: a PGI may be discontinued for many years 
if a product stops being produced but will be revived as soon as an operator starts to produce a 
good that conforms to the product specification for that PGI. This property of permanence 
underlines the independence of the IP right of a PGI, from the operators’ actions. 
 
                                                 
11 Langinier and Babcock (2008) have suggested that PGIs can be seen as ‘club goods’. For that, they consider 
that producers are free to decide the size of the club representing a PGI. This idea is however in contradiction 
with the non-excludability property underlined here. 
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The main consequence for our analysis of the Court’s judgements of this interpretation 
of the nature of the IP rights of PGIs which underlines their public good dimension is 
straightforward. In awarding costs to the different Member States involved in these cases, the 
Court explicitly stated that the names and regional labels being judged were not IP rights, 
unlike the case of PGIs. If operators want to seek IP within a different format, other 
possibilities can be explored such as individually owned or collective trademarks. However, 
whatever form is considered, the dimension of a public good will not be reached. The 
properties of ‘non-rivalry’ and ‘non-excludability’ are assigned to PGIs by the European 
Regulation and are not the consequences of material properties, as is the case with a 
conventional public good. It is the consequence of the expression of an implicit social choice 
that gives these properties to the intellectual protection bestowed by PGIs. This choice 
supports the intangible properties of PGIs, of inheritance and timelessness. 
 
These remarks raise a series of questions. Should we limit a specific legal protection 
related to origin labelling, for IP that can be considered as public goods? What are the 
consequences (both private and social) of using trademarks to afford legal protection of IP 
rights through some form of geographic labelling? Would this option be ‘economically’ 
feasible? Could collective trademarks be considered as having a public good dimension? If 
not, what are the consequences? We try to answer these questions and examine any 
consequences in the next two sections. 
 
 
 
3 Collective trademarks and PGIs 
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A brief history of the agricultural products that were protected under national legal protection 
schemes shows that some are now protected by PGIs and some are protected under quality 
signs such as the French ‘Label Rouge’.12 These protections are not at issue for all the 
products to which they relate. Some regional labels have turned into collective trademarks.13 
In order to get a complete picture of the consequences of the Court ruling we need to consider 
the possibility to protect a geographic name with a collective trademark. 
 
A trademark can be owned by an individual or by a legal entity representing a group of 
operators. The latter occurs when a specific agricultural product is produced by several small 
operators for whom the financial burden of owning a trademark on their own would be too 
great. Operating as a group eases for example the advertising costs involved in building and 
maintaining trademark reputation. However, it does imply some coordination costs. We focus 
on this form of protection since it is a good illustration of the context that has likely created 
the need for the national legal protections condemned by the Court in the cases described in 
this paper. The trademarks owned by legal entities are known as ‘marques collectives de 
certification’ in France and ‘collective trademarks’ within the Office for Harmonization in the 
Internal Market (OHIM) at European level.14 In this paper, we do not distinguish between 
types and refer to them as ‘collective trademarks’ throughout. 
 
                                                 
12 Saucisson sec d’Auvergne was protected under the regional label “Auvergne” and was awarded the French 
quality sign ‘Label Rouge’. 
13 This is the case for example for the label ‘Savoie’, http://www.marque-savoie.com/ (visited 10 November 
2008). The trademark ‘Ardennes de France’ is another example, http://www.ardennes-de-
france.com/association/ardennes-de-france.html (visited 10 November 2008). 
14 Ibele (2009) and Schuler (2009) compares PGIs with certification and collective marks found in the US 
Trademark Act. 
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Collective trademarks and PGIs have several common points. First, both are IP rights. 
Second, a collective trademark such as the French ‘marque collective de certification’15 is 
defined in terms of the origin of the product, and this is the case for other types of collective 
trademarks. Third, as in the case of a PGI, only a group is entitled to register a collective 
trademark, and product specification, which is an important aspect of PGIs in the European 
Regulation, is also imperative for a collective trademark, and is now called ‘rule’ in the 
collective trademark scheme. Finally, the idea that an operator can use the relevant collective 
trademark as soon as he complies with the requirements of the ‘rule’ also applies to certain 
forms of collective trademarks.16 
 
A collective trademark, therefore, implies non-rivalry and non-excludability. Can we 
therefore assume a public good dimension in the IP rights bestowed by a collective trademark 
as in the case of a PGI? The answer is no. To become a PGI, a GI has to apply for registration. 
The European Commission in evaluating whether to accept or reject the application considers 
two things. The first is a series of points (Article 5.3 of the European Regulation) relating to 
the legitimacy of GI in reference to the particular product: e.g. the definition of the product, 
the definition of the geographical area, the link between the product and the geographical 
environment and, “where appropriate, the specific elements of the product description or 
production method justifying the link”. The second (Article 7 of the European Regulation) 
involves examining the objections (if any) to the proposed registration (e.g., a conflict with a 
generic name or an existing trademark, etc.), the admissibility of these objections, and, where 
necessary, taking decisions on these aspects. The application procedure in the case of 
trademarks (and therefore “collective trademarks”) is less cumbersome under national 
                                                 
15 ‘Cochon de Bretagne’ is an example. 
16 This is true for ‘marques collectives de certification’ in particular. 
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regulations or the OHIM directives at European level. Qualification for a collective trademark 
is based on certain general attributes (novelty of the trademark, product with individual 
characteristics, a denomination that is not contrary to public policy, etc.) and the guidelines in 
the OHIM concerning its proceedings focus on objections (the trademark shall be justifiable 
in the preceding sense and not conflict with existing trademarks) rather than on the 
authenticity of the geographical indication per se. Thus, demonstrating the existence of a link 
between quality of the good and the natural and human environment of its origin is not 
compulsory within the ‘rule’ document of a collective trademark, which allows greater 
latitude to applicants for collective trademarks. 
 
This greater latitude can be exploited by a group of producers in order to obtain a rule 
for a collective trademark that is more restrictive than the product specification in a PGI. A 
group of producers can limit access by other producers by including constraints relating to the 
production area and production technique, all of which will contribute to increasing profits. 
This clearly shows that the IP of a collective trademark is ‘congestible’, and does not have the 
dimensions of a pure public good where, ideally, such congestion cannot appear. In other 
words, the IP of a trademark encompasses some characteristics that are halfway between a 
purely public good (non-rival and non-excludable) and a purely private good (rival and 
excludable) to obtain a club good attributes (non rival, non excludable and congestible). What 
are the consequences for the cases under scrutiny? We deal with these below. 
 
 
 
4 Analysis of the cases 
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The key words in the Court’s decisions were the same: preservation of the ‘free movement of 
goods’ between Member States. Does this guarantee the maximum wellbeing of society? We 
consider this question looking first at informational problems and, second, with the help of the 
relationship established between the IP of a PGI and a public good on the one hand, and the 
IP of collective trademarks and club goods on the other hand. 
 
 
4.1 Provision for the free movement of goods, competition and information  
 
The rule bestowing free movement of goods between Member States has normative roots. It is 
seen as a necessary condition for competition in markets. From that perspective, the Court’s 
decisions clearly consider the national legal protections afforded by names and regional labels 
in these cases as policies implying or favouring withdrawn attitudes by domestic consumers 
towards national products. Favouring this kind of behaviour with a national policy is seen as 
equivalent to an implicit entry barrier and is banned. However, names and regional labels can 
also be quality signs which give information to consumers in the context of asymmetric 
information. A number of theoretical results point to the utility of public intervention in such 
contexts, since without such signalling, the market for high quality goods could collapse. The 
case of ‘credence goods’,17 that is goods for which consumers cannot determine the quality - 
either before or after purchase, is particularly sensitive. Geographical origin is typically a 
credence attribute. Signalling this origin to consumers where demand for this attribute exists, 
is thus essential. The information provided transforms a credence good into a ‘search good’, 
that is, a good where consumers can check the quality before they purchase. Without 
                                                 
17 See Nelson (1970). 
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signalling, the variety of goods available on the market would diminish, decreasing the 
wellbeing of society. 
 
Signalling of credence attributes, however, is something of a puzzle (Auriol and 
Schilizzi 2003). Because these attributes can never be experienced by consumers, signalling 
through price or producer’s reputation is not very effective. Certification of credence 
attributes provides a way to transmit missing information to consumers. As a consequence, 
this is an important aspect of the national legal protections provided by the names and 
regional labels in the cases analysed. In making certification available, these national policies 
can be seen as organizing information delivery and would therefore be useful from a 
wellbeing maximization perspective. At the same time, however, such policies simultaneously 
protect producers from competition giving them a market power that increases their surplus, 
but generating fewer exchanges than the optimum. As a result, the legal protection of 
geographical origin would be justified if the net effect on society is positive, which is 
something that has to be evaluated, case-by-case, as shown in the economics literature. 
 
In order to characterize this situation, Marette and Crespi (2003) consider a case where 
producers of high quality goods (with high quality understood as a credence attribute) bear 
higher cost of production than producers of low quality goods, but can certificate the high 
quality and create a cartel, which has the power to reduce the quantities available in the 
market so as to increase price. Controlling the quantities of high quality goods supplied to the 
market creates incentives for producers to differentiate their production with high quality 
goods. Certification allows consumers to choose the quality they want, and therefore increases 
their surplus. In cases where the certification cost is high, Marette and Crespi show that, if the 
product differentiation allowed by quality certification is sufficiently high, the positive effects 
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of certification are bigger than the negative one of increased market power for producers. This 
idea that a sufficiently high product differentiation is necessary to make national protective 
policies and quality certification welfare improving, was also found by Zago and Pick (2004). 
Zago and Pick also show that in a situation characterized by a high fixed certification cost and 
a large difference between the marginal costs of a high quality product and a low quality 
product, protecting geographical indications can reduce the wellbeing of society. In a different 
setting, Moschini and al. (2008) consider the case of a competitive market for a GI-certified 
good. In that context they show that the need for certification involving fixed costs creates 
increasing returns to scale at the industry level, so that the competitive equilibrium cannot be 
Pareto efficient. Under-provision of the GI-certified good appears as a consequence. 
Furthermore, since in that competitive setting the producers have no market power, they do 
not take advantage of the GI protection, whereas consumers do. 
 
These results in the economics literature on GI protections can be used to qualify the 
reference to free movement of goods used in the analysed Court decisions. They show 
effectively that protecting GIs can be defended even when it has an effect on competition in 
the market, since GIs furnish valuable information to consumers. The results of Moschini and 
al. (2008) go further. Maintaining the hypothesis of competitive market and pointing out that 
the fixed certification cost creates a distortion to the first best equilibrium, the authors show 
that the protection of GI as a form of intellectual property alone is not sufficient to ensure an 
optimal provision of GI-certified goods. A government aiming at restoring the Pareto 
efficiency should therefore consider additional form of support to GIs. These results underline 
the need for protection and permit to understand why, as soon as the national quality signs 
under scrutiny have been condemned by the Court, other forms of protection have been 
sought after. Compared to this, the conclusions of the analysis considering imperfect 
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competition form a contrast. They stress that protection of GIs should not be considered 
automatic and evaluations needs to be made case by case, taking account especially of 
certification cost, degree of differentiation between quality levels and differences in marginal 
costs of production. The specificity of a large part of the agricultural products initially 
protected by the disallowed national policies was not strong, the labelling referring to classes 
of products rather single products. In our view, therefore, for many products, an analysis of 
information provided by such labelling would support the Court’s decisions. 
 
 
4.2 The IP right of a collective trademark as a club good 
 
The producers whose national protection was disallowed by the Court, could gain protection 
for their products under the trademark scheme as outlined in Section III. Collective 
trademarks are of particular interest here. They can include the geographical origin of the 
product and they constitute a way of sharing out the cost of managing a brand image. This 
latter is especially significant for small businesses. The feasibility of this strategy and 
whether, compared to the protection provided by a national regulation, this strategy has an 
effect on the wellbeing of society are questions that need to be addressed. Finding the answers 
to these questions would enable a better appreciation of the consequences of the Court 
decisions. We consider first the latitude offered to operators in the elaboration of the ‘rule’ of 
a collective trademark and second the cost of the protection mode. 
 
As described in section III, one of the main consequences of resorting to a collective 
trademark rather than a PGI for protection of activities, is the latitude given to operators in 
setting the rules defining a collective trademark. Groups of producers are allowed to enforce 
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restrictive dispositions in order to limit access by other producers in order to increase their 
profits. Not only can there be limitations imposed on the legitimate production area, but also 
only certain techniques may be considered eligible. There are consequences from these 
practices. Lence et al. (2007) for instance compare the different legal forms of production 
organization allowing the supply of high quality products to be controlled (in order to make 
them more profitable for producers). These include limiting the cultivated surface area, or 
implementing restrictions on the production process, or a combination of both. Lence et al. 
(2007) show that these various modes of organization of supply impact differently on the total 
surplus for society. A regulation that would favour restrictions on the production process 
without any other form of limitation could provide incentives for producers to choose 
production techniques that were more restrictive than necessary, to obtain high quality goods. 
This situation would impose an unnecessary social cost as a consequence. In considering only 
the free movement of goods in order to rule against the national protection of names and 
regional labels ignores these kinds of effects. However, if producers seek protection under a 
collective trademark these effects could be significant. Another way to consider the Court’s 
ruling therefore would be to make reference to collective trademarks as an alternative mode of 
protection for the particular activities and look at the costs of this protection. 
 
The organization of the supply of goods that have a common specificity (here names 
or regional labels), but are produced by different operators implies costs. These costs are 
different from the operating costs borne by individual operators. They concern specifically the 
coordination required among producers and the costs involved in promoting a trademark: 
product specification establishment, maintaining brand reputation, etc. These ‘collective 
trademark costs’ are shared by the producers and should be regarded as the costs of creating 
the value of the IP right of the trademark. The theory of club goods initiated by Buchanan 
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(1965) shows that comparing the costs per person in a club with the benefits per person, 
enables the optimal size of the club to be determined.18  
 
Under the disallowed national protections or under a PGI regime these cost of 
coordination are small compared to what they could be within a collective trademark scheme: 
the denominations can easily be defended, the regulatory labels act as quality signs whereas a 
collective trademark requires that its ‘rule’ be specified, its brand image established and 
defended, etc.). Banning the legal national protections by names and regional labels creates a 
negative external shock on the activities involved. If collective trademarks are chosen as the 
alternative mode of protection, the operators’ coordination framework has to be reinvented 
and its cost supported. The increase in coordination costs affects the optimal size of the 
producers’ club. However, the effect is not systematic and depends on the shape of the cost 
function. This is illustrated in figure 1. 
                                                 
18 See Glazer et al. (1997) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) for a survey. 
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FIGURE 119 
 
In this figure,  XsB ,  is the benefit per person of the producers’ club membership for a 
given level X  of reputation created/defended for their collective trademark. This benefit first 
increases with the size s of the group and then decreases. The decrease is due to congestion, 
whereas the increase can be explained by positive externalities: for a given level of reputation 
of a collective trademark the increase in the number of producers in the group reinforces the 
presence of the trademark in the market so that the benefit per person increases (until 
                                                 
19 Derived from J. M. Buchanan (1965). The curves are representing the following functions: 
  3
4
1, 2  ssXsB ,  
s
RXsC 1,, 0  ,   sRXsC 3,, 1   and   1,01 3,,~ sRXsC   and the three different 
optimal sizes are calculated with these functions : ̃ݏ ൌ 2,24, ݏ଴כ ൌ 2,36 and ݏଵכ ൌ 2,78. 
Benefits, 
Costs 
1 ݏଵ෥  ݏ଴כ ݏଵכ size
ܤሺݏ, തܺሻ
ܥሚሺݏ, തܺ, ܴଵሻ
ܥሺݏ, തܺ, ܴଵሻ 
ܥሺݏ, തܺ, ܴ଴ሻ
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congestion occurs). The curves  0,, RXsC  and  1,, RXsC  and  1,,~ RXsC  stand for the cost of 
the club per person, for a given reputation of the collective trademark X , under different 
protective regimes 0R  and 1R . The optimal size for the producer group is calculated 
maximizing the difference between benefit and cost.20 The curve  0,, RXsC  represents the 
cost per person under the condemned national protection for regional names and labels. With 
this cost the optimal size is 0s . The curves  1,, RXsC  and  1,,~ RXsC  represents the cost of the 
club per person under a collective trademark for two different scenarios.  
 
Both scenarios consider that exchanging the initial national protection for protection 
by a collective trademark raises the cost per person. In the first scenario, the new cost function 
 1,, RXsC  compared with the benefit function  XsB ,  implies an increase in the optimal size 
of the producers club (from 0s  to 1s ). This increase in the club’s size allows the higher costs 
to be shared among a larger number of producers. In the second scenario, the new cost 
function  1,,~ RXsC  and the benefit function  XsB ,  implies a decrease in the optimal size of 
the producers’ club (from 0s  to *1~s ). This decrease in the club size moderates the increased 
costs of coordination. The relevance of these scenarios has to be evaluated case by case 
because they imply completely different social difficulties. 
 
If the optimal size of the producers club increases following a shift in protection mode, 
as in the first scenario, it is important to ensure that a sufficient number of producers exists. 
Obtaining an optimum number in remote rural areas that probably were the target of the 
disallowed national legal protections might be difficult. Situations could arise in which a club 
                                                 
20 This optimal size is obtained where the derivatives of the benefit and cost functions are equal. 
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cannot emerge because of an insufficient number of producers to cope with a significant 
increase in costs. 
 
If, as in the second scenario, the optimal size of the producers club decreases 
following the shift in the protection mode, fewer producers will be protected. The unprotected 
ones may disappear or be in less favourable positions. As a consequence, the protected 
producers will have stronger market power. In that case, a decrease in the quantity of the good 
produced would therefore affect the wellbeing of the society.  
 
These effects of the Court’s decision on both the number of producers protected and 
on the quantity of high quality goods supplied, highlight other aspects of the problem than the 
mere free movement of good. No systematic conclusions can be drawn; a case by case 
approach is the only possible approach to assessing their existence and magnitude. 
 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The relation established in this paper between the IP rights of PGIs and public goods on the 
one hand, and between the IP rights of collective trademarks and club goods on the other 
hand, has some implications for the rulings made by the Court on several cases concerning 
legal national protection afforded to geographical names and labels that do not comply with 
the European Regulation on PGIs. Some of the results from this analysis uphold the Court’s 
decisions; others provide reasons for different judgements. For example, stressing the implicit 
dimension of public good in the IP rights of a PGI adds emphasis to the Court’s reasoning 
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considering that PGIs should be considered as an exception to the rule of free movement of 
goods. However, when we consider the rulings of the Court in terms of their potential effects 
on the well-being of society, we can show that the capacity of the condemned national legal 
protection to provide information to consumers should not be ignored and should be evaluated 
case by case. From this point of view, we would argue that the effects of choosing alternative 
protection modes, such as collective trademarks, in the wake of the Court’s decisions should 
also be considered. 
 
Evaluation of the capacity of national legal protection for geographical names and 
labels to provide information highlights the issue of product differentiation. The generality of 
the names and labels at stake in the cases considered and the fact that they address classes of 
products rather than individual goods would suggest that an examination of the information 
provided by the names and labels would add force to the Court’s rulings. The consideration of 
alternative protection modes, such as collective trademarks, is far more delicate. First, such 
consideration highlights the motives of protection of rural economies, in many cases 
constituted of small producers without the capacity to efficiently develop individual 
trademarks in order to signal the quality of their products. Protecting such rural economies 
was probably the real aim of the original national policies. Second, such consideration draws 
attention to collective trademarks making reference to geographical origin, as substitutes for 
PGIs. The property of a club good given to this form of IP in this article underlines the 
importance of the congestion phenomenon. An optimal size for the producer group protected 
under a collective trademark can be determined in order to manage congestion and 
coordination cost. The optimal size of the producer group can be different from the number of 
producers initially protected under the disallowed national policies. The question of the 
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feasibility of such a producer group and the impact on the quantities produced should thus be 
addressed. 
 
An analysis that would focus on maximizing society’s well-being would therefore give 
weight to the amount of information provided to consumers, the latitude allowed to producers 
to limit their production and the feasibility of a producers club. Case-by-case studies would be 
necessary and the results would most probably be different in each case. The invariability of 
the approach chosen by the Court along the different cases and the correspondence in its 
conclusions underline the primacy given by the Court to the free movement of goods over any 
other criteria. 
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